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BRENNAN AND BREWBAKER’S CHRISTIAN
LEGAL THOUGHT: PROVIDING THE
FOUNDATIONS FOR ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE UNDERSTANDING
ANGELA C. CARMELLA†
INTRODUCTION
Catholic and Evangelical Protestant institutions have very
little use for the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Of course, they appreciate the clause when it bolsters the Free
Exercise Clause to limit government entanglement in church
institutions, to protect church autonomy, and to prohibit
preference of one religion over another.1 But they tend to reject
the notion that the Establishment Clause plays a role in limiting
religious exercise. As to government messages and government
money, these Christian communities take a decidedly narrow
view of the clause.2 They favor civic acknowledgement of the
nation’s Judeo-Christian heritage as well as financial support for
church schools and other religious institutions. On issues of
exemptions, they take a broad view of the free exercise right of
Christians to be exempt from laws inconsistent with their
teachings, whether individual or communal, nonprofit or forprofit; and they reject the notion that disruptions or burdens to
third parties resulting from exemptions implicate the
Establishment Clause.3
†

Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law
See generally Angela C. Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion
Clauses and Political-Legal Compromise, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2017).
2
See generally Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money:
Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 771 (2001).
3
The Supreme Court has been asked to grant or uphold exemptions to religious
institutions in a number of cases. See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016);
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989);
1
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Under this approach—which clearly prioritizes the
protection of religious exercise as well as the religious messages
of cultural and political institutions—it appears that the
Establishment Clause plays little or no role independent of the
Free Exercise Clause. My question, then, is whether Christian
legal thought compels us, or at least supports, such a reading of
the Establishment Clause. In other words, does this lack of
concern for non-establishment norms inhere in Christian legal
and political thought? I look to Patrick Brennan and William
Brewbaker’s casebook—Christian Legal Thought: Materials and
Cases (“CLT”)4—in search of a framework for exploration. And I
am not disappointed. The book provides a treasure of excerpts,
commentary, and questions that can enlighten our
understanding of Christian perspectives on Establishment
Clause interpretation and on notions of non-establishment more
generally. While only a small part of the book explicitly
addresses modern notions of “church and state” and
establishment,5 CLT provides a comprehensive review of each of
the major traditions within Christianity (Catholic, Lutheran,
Anabaptist, Calvinist, and Reformed) and develops multiple,
interconnected concepts—the nature of church, society, state,
authority, culture, and the purpose of law—all of which are
implicated in Establishment Clause interpretation. In some
senses, the entire book helps us explore the question I pose. But
I refer more specifically to those concepts that inform our
understanding in the specific American legal context. Indeed,
CLT shows us how integral Christian concepts are to the way we
think and speak about law, and the way we are politically and
socially organized. It implicitly criticizes the task of some
Establishment Clause interpretations to “separate out” what is
religious. On the other hand, it recognizes the modern conditions
and challenges of religious pluralism within a secular state. CLT
provides students and scholars with the intellectual resources to
consider the meaning of non-establishment in a holistic and
nuanced way.6
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
4
PATRICK MCKINLEY BRENNAN & WILLIAM S. BREWBAKER III, CHRISTIAN
LEGAL THOUGHT: MATERIALS AND CASES (2017) [hereinafter CLT].
5
Id. at 467–97.
6
One caveat to the reader: my deep interest in Catholicism has meant that my
attention has been drawn primarily to Catholic materials within the book.
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THE SUPREME COURT’S USE OF CHURCH-STATE HISTORY FOR
INTERPRETING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Before describing the contribution of CLT to understanding
the Establishment Clause, I would like to set out some relevant
considerations of current Establishment Clause interpretation.
Political and lawmaking authority come through the “state” in
liberalism. The clause focuses on the secularity of the state, both
as to the nature of the political and legal acts it may take and as
a way of distinguishing itself from the religious nature of
churches. In relation to religious people and institutions, the
state can protect religious exercise as a civil right. The state is
distinct from religious communities and, while it can relate to
them, cannot delegate governmental powers to them and cannot
interfere with or usurp their religious functions or decisions. It
can give benefits to religious institutions as long as those benefits
are not distributed on religious criteria and are the result of
private decision, and it can recognize the secular aspects of
religious symbols and celebrations. The state cannot influence
private religious decisions and cannot itself make religious
decisions. It cannot endorse or disapprove of religion by making
religion relevant to a citizen’s standing in the political
community. It cannot coerce religious observance, even if no
legal penalty is involved.
It is true that in the past the Establishment Clause has been
interpreted both more narrowly (to forbid fewer forms of
government support to religion, as in the pre-1947 period) and
more broadly (to forbid many more forms of government support
to religion, as in the era of the heightened Lemon test7). But
there has been a consistent understanding that state and church
should not be confused or conflated, that institutional boundaries
should be respected, and that symbolic government-religion
relationships should be ordered toward civic as opposed to
confessional ends.
To reinforce the state’s secularity, the Supreme Court has on
occasion given historical context to the Establishment Clause. In
its early modern jurisprudence, starting with Everson v. Board of
Education in 1947, the Court appeared to be answering the
question of whether the clause was designed to protect nonpreferential assistance to various churches, or whether it was
7

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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designed to bar all assistance to churches.8 It first answered
with an absolutist historical account, justifying a separationist
prohibition on assistance to any and all religion.9 In this account,
Madison and Jefferson, as authoritative interpreters of the First
Amendment, are staunch supporters of the separation of church
and state; the Virginia disestablishment experience becomes
normative for interpreting the clause. Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance makes a theological case for leaving Christianity
alone on the grounds that to fund it is to destroy it.10 This
pietistic separationism (going hand-in-hand with enlightenment
separationism) is both described and criticized in CLT. The book
discusses both the Baptist rejection of government support of
Christianity (and the emphasis on soul liberty)11 and the
conservative critics who think these Christians were misguided
and indeed duped by secular separationists.12
To counter this historical narrative, Catholics (and later
Evangelical Protestants) offered an accommodationist account,
pointing to the many cooperative church-state relationships and
pervasive Christian symbols and practices in the founding period
and embracing Washington and others who thought the support
of religion and morality was critical to developing the virtuous
citizenry necessary to self-government.13 Jesuit theologian and
public philosopher John Courtney Murray, S.J. rejected the
separationist narrative as one that embraced a Madisonian

8

See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
See id. at 11–16; see also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 217 (1948); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428–30 (1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963) (citing Everson and declaring “the views of
Madison and Jefferson . . . came to be incorporated not only in the Federal
Constitution but likewise in those of most of our States”).
10
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
¶ 6 (1785).
11
Timothy L. Hall, “Incendiaries of Commonwealths”: Baptists and Law, in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 340–53 (Michael W. McConnell et al.
eds., 2001), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 276–78.
12
OLIVER O’DONOVAN, DESIRE OF THE NATIONS: REDISCOVERING THE ROOTS OF
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 244, 246–47, 249 (1996), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at
471–72.
13
See, e.g., ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1950); CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, ARTHUR T. DOWNEY & EDWARD C. ROBERTS,
FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES (1964) (scholarship regarding the nonpreferential accommodation of religion in the founding period).
9
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theology—one of privatized religion.14 The religion clauses were
“articles of peace,” not “of faith,” he contended.15
The
accommodationist narrative that he and other Catholics helped
to craft was consistently presented to the Supreme Court; it
made its way into several opinions,16 and pieces of it have been
influential in various cases. CLT helps us to understand why
Catholics would be adamant about state accommodation of
religion, given the Church’s long theological understanding of
law as the province of both church and state, and particularly the
interconnectedness of divine, natural, and human law.
The separationist and accommodationist narratives, as used
by the Supreme Court, provide justification for their decisions;
and though they glean some significant theological and
philosophical ideas of the founding period, they give us a rather
thin conception of the nature of non-establishment. In the last
thirty years the Court has rarely noted historical or intellectual
foundations at all. These histories give us a sense of separate
jurisdictions and the need for care in the church-state
relationship, but the fact that they are employed inconsistently
and primarily to justify a particular outcome leaves us in search
of a principle. Up until now, the principle has been defined in a
variety of ways: psychological tests concerning “endorsement”17
and “coercion,”18 wildly varied applications of Lemon, vague
notions of neutrality,19 concern over judicial legitimacy,20 and
formalism.21 Can we do better? Yes. We can try to retrieve some
Christian legal concepts to get a more expansive understanding
of the nature of political authority and law. If the Establishment
Clause is about the secularity of politics and law and the

14
Frederick G. Lawrence, John Courtney Murray and the Ambiguities of
Liberalism, in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION 41, 50–51
(Leon Hooper, S.J. & Todd David Whitmore eds., 1996), as reprinted in CLT, supra
note 4, at 491–92.
15
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 68 (2005).
16
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673–78 (1984); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
17
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687, 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
18
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 585, 592 (1992).
19
Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1842–43 (2014) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
20
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
21
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714–15 (2010).
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flourishing of pluralism, then CLT can help us understand the
Christian roots of modern secularity as well as the Christian
engagement with pluralism.22
II. THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH AS STATE WITH POLITICAL AND
LAWMAKING AUTHORITY
Christianity, unlike Judaism and Islam, does not have a
revealed legal code for living in society. Christianity became
institutionalized as a legal and political system through the
repeated controversies between popes and kings, in which they
competed for power and jurisdiction. CLT provides excellent
historical background to illustrate these developments. Pope
Gelasius, in the fifth century, noted the spiritual and temporal
jurisdictions, and claimed for the Church “genuine ruling
authority . . . on at least a par with that exercised by the state.”23
And in the Papal Revolution of the 11th and 12th centuries, the
Church took on a corporate legal existence and claimed
independence on ecclesiastical and some political matters.24 As
the excerpts from Harold Berman’s work in CLT make clear, the
Papal Revolution not only forged the “freedom of the Church” but
gave birth to the modern state of the West—with the Church
itself the first state.25 As a state, the Church through law sought
to “reform the world in order to save souls.”26 As a law-making
and law-enforcing authority, it competed with the secular
authorities for power and “claimed a right to exercise coercive
jurisdiction through law.”27 In this way, Christianity became
institutionalized through law.28 Later, during the Protestant
Reformation and the rise of various theories that reinforced the
notion of distinct jurisdictions (for example, Luther’s Two
Kingdoms, Calvin’s Spiritual and Civil Government), “spiritual
authority and spiritual responsibilities” were transferred to

22

See infra Part III.
CLT, supra note 4, at 475 (discussing Letter from Pope Gelasius I to Emperor
Anastasius (494)).
24
Id. at 222.
25
HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 113 (1983), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 223.
26
Id. at 222 (casebook authors summarizing Berman’s account).
27
Id. at 223.
28
Id. at 222.
23
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secular leaders.29 Sometimes church and state had separate
jurisdictions; on some matters, they shared concurrent
jurisdiction.
But the “dualism of spiritual and secular
jurisdictions” persisted.30 As Berman notes:
The idea of the secular state, which was implicit in the Papal
Revolution from its inception, and the reality of the secular
state, which emerged out of the historical struggle between
ecclesiastical and secular forces that constituted the Papal
Revolution, were in essence the idea and the reality of a state
ruled by law . . . . This meant, first, that the respective heads of
each body, the ecclesiastical and the secular, would introduce
and maintain their own legal systems. . . . Second, it meant that
the respective heads of each department would be bound by the
law which they themselves had enacted . . . . It meant, third,
that each jurisdiction would also be lawful; each state existed
within a system of plural jurisdictions. . . . If the church was to
have inviolable legal rights, the state had to accept those rights
as a lawful limitation upon its own supremacy. Similarly, the
rights of the state constituted a lawful limitation upon the
supremacy of the church. The two powers could only coexist
peacefully through a shared recognition of the rule of law, its
supremacy over each.31

Thus, even without revealed law within the Christian Scriptures
or tradition, the Church came to be fully entrenched in a legal
system. Thomas Aquinas, 13th century theologian, philosopher,
and jurist, has been immensely influential in framing a Christian
theory of law. His works figure prominently in CLT.
Aquinas grounds law in reason.
He notes that the
providence of God orders all things to their ends, so that nothing
is irrational; there is divine order in all creation.32 This divine
governance then takes the form of law, “eternal, divine, natural,
and human.”33 As Pope Benedict XVI has noted, “nature and

29
HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT
REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003), as reprinted in CLT,
supra note 4, at 224.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 227.
32
CLT, supra note 4, at 379.
33
Id. at 380.
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reason [are] the true sources of law.”34 According to Aquinas, law
is “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him
who has care of the community.”35
The Aquinas excerpts in CLT demonstrate his integrated,
rational approach. The purpose of human law for Aquinas is to
make people virtuous, at least gradually, by making them less
vicious.36 People are capable of virtue, but those predisposed to
evil can only be made better by coercive law. Even custom can be
treated as law.37 While human law could not and should not
replicate all of higher law, human law is derived from natural
law: “[A] thing is said to be just, from being right, according to
the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of
nature . . . . [So law] is derived from the law of nature. . . . [I]f in
any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law
but a perversion of law.”38 Contemporary Catholic teaching
continues to hold that a law that is “at variance with reason” is
unjust and “is an act of violence.”39 Natural law theorists note
that many kinds of human law can be considered reasonable in
general, but that only by specific and prudent elaboration by
judges and legislators can we know if a law comports with this
standard.40 Obviously, Thomas’ teachings are interconnected in
many ways. CLT provides complementary materials. For
instance, it explores the relationship between law and culture—
law leads a person to virtue, culture leads a person to the natural
common good.41
The Thomistic view of law’s moral purpose is named legal
moralism. Aquinas gave the Church a worldview of harmony in
which conflict over the substantive definition and application of

34
Id. at 493 (quoting BENEDICT XVI, APOSTOLIC JOURNEY TO GERMANY
ADDRESS AT BUNDESTAG (Sept. 22, 2011)).
35
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 90.4, as reprinted in
CLT, supra note 4, at 385.
36
CLT, supra note 4, at 429.
37
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 97.3, as reprinted in
CLT, supra note 4, at 191.
38
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 95.2, as reprinted in
CLT, supra note 4, at 435.
39
JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS, ¶ 51 (1963), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4,
at 80, 84.
40
See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011), as
reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 436–37; RÉMI BRAGUE, THE LAW OF GOD: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA (2008), quoted in CLT, supra note 4, at 437.
41
CLT, supra note 4, at 182.
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virtue is absent. CLT provides examples of both contemporary
proponents and critics of the moral purpose of law. Pope
Benedict XVI noted “the harmony of objective and subjective
reason,”42 while Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr
observed that Aquinas’ natural law—as the part of the eternal or
divine law manifested in a “universal” human reason—obscured
historical variation in reason and made a pretentious claim to
certainty on moral issues.43 It is good to hear many Christian
voices weighing in on these matters.
For Aquinas, all of human law had to comport with universal
reason in accordance with Christian moral teaching. This unity
again emphasizes a harmonious sense of law and political
authority rather than a conflicted or adversarial system (even
while great church-state power struggles are under way). As
Berman noted in the language quoted above, both ecclesiastical
and state authorities had to recognize the separate jurisdictions
of each but also had to recognize the supremacy of the rule of law
over both. The Church obviously had much to say about what
was moral, and thus to judge whether law was a perversion or a
proper way toward virtue.
Church teaching on political authority envisioned the unity
of law under a comprehensive moral vision. The state was
viewed as a “perfect society” with “supreme power” subject to the
natural limits of other spheres, like family and Church—the
latter being considered a perfect society as well, with the pope
having supreme power in the religious realm.44 Reinforcing this
sense of unity was a theological, as opposed to natural law,
doctrine, the Kingship of Christ, in which Christ as King has
supreme authority over all of government and society.45 His
Kingship was consistent with the separate jurisdictions of church
and state, since their responsibilities differ (mirroring Christ’s
priestly and royal roles); His Church has genuine ruling
authority “on at least a par with that exercised by the state.”46
42

BENEDICT XVI, APOSTOLIC JOURNEY TO GERMANY ADDRESS AT BUNDESTAG
(Sept. 22, 2011), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 493.
43
REINHOLD NIEBUHR, 2 THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN 252–53 (1943), as
reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 410–11.
44
HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 397–98, 400–
01 (1947), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 478–79.
45
PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUAS PRIMAS (1925), as reprinted in CLT, supra
note 4, at 484.
46
CLT, supra note 4, at 475.
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CLT offers a fascinating description of Christendom and the
Kingship of Christ, noting its expression as late as 1925 in the
encyclical Quas Primas.47
In Quas Primas, the fact that Christ is a law-giver means
that secular leaders are invested with religious significance and
should be obeyed.48 The document assumes benevolent rulers
who understand when “they rule, not by their own right, but by
the mandate and in the place of the Divine King, they will
exercise their authority piously and wisely” in accord with
“common good” and “human dignity.”49 Indeed, to the critical eye
of Catholic intellectual Jacques Maritain, such thinking reflected
a long history that justified “absolute sovereignty on the basis of
a theological myth, the divine right of kings” and on the notion of
“ ‘substantialism’—the ‘myth that the state is the people
personified.’ ”50
The dangers of sacralizing existing political authority are
immediately apparent, which may explain why the Kingship of
Christ has fallen out of use in Catholic social thought. But CLT
shows the power of the concept when it is used to condemn,
rather than support, existing authority. Dietrich Bonhoeffer
used the Kingship of Christ in a prophetic way to criticize the
Nazi regime and to remind the Lutheran Church that the
church’s role is to “bring[] government to an understanding of
itself.”51 Given the state’s divine origin, it must obey Jesus.52 By
this, Bonhoeffer does not mean that government is supposed to
enact Christian law and policy. Rather, government is to be a
“true government in accordance with its own special task[s].”53
The Church claims institutional protection for itself and its

47
See generally QUAS PRIMAS, supra note 45, as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4,
at 484–85.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 485.
50
Russell Hittinger, Reasons for a Civil Society, in REASSESSING THE LIBERAL
STATE 11, 23 (Timothy Fuller & John P. Hittinger eds., 2001), as reprinted in CLT,
supra note 4, at 487 (reviewing Maritain’s Man and the State).
51
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 342 (1955), as reprinted in CLT, supra note
4, at 482, 483.
52
See id.
53
Id.
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proclamation, and for Christians to live in obedience to Jesus.54
Bonhoeffer says government cannot be grounded in natural
law—only in Christ.55
III. THE MODERN ERA: THE DESACRALIZED STATE IN CHRISTIAN
LEGAL THOUGHT
In contrast to the traditional Catholic doctrine of
sovereignty, in the last century and a half, “Catholic thought has
been liberated from any temptation to sacralize or substantialize
the state” that the traditional doctrine had implied.56 Catholic
intellectuals Jacques Maritain and John Courtney Murray, S.J.,
who were influenced profoundly by the U.S. Constitution,
developed an “instrumentalist concept” of the state, with law
serving rights and liberties of various social groups that together
cannot be equated with the state.57 This transition to the
instrumental state is a dramatic and difficult one for the Catholic
tradition.
As is seen above in Part II, the tradition’s
anthropological, social, political, and legal concepts create a fully
harmonious vision of the person, the society, the state, and the
legal system, each sharing compatible moral standards and
purposes. Modern Church social teachings do not abandon this
harmony; but now the teachings must engage a new reality in
which church and state no longer share the norms of a common
culture.
We see the recognition of this new reality with
particular intensity in the documents of the Second Vatican
Council, 1962–1965, and in some of the current ambivalence
toward the secular state voiced in litigation and lobbying
positions.
In my view, six relevant themes emerge from the wealth of
materials in CLT to help us explore the notion of the
instrumental state and the non-establishment norms that define
some of the limits to its political and legal authority. First, there
is the theme of subsidiarity. In addition to legal theory,
Christians have developed related social theories. No longer
fixated exclusively on the relationship between ecclesiastical and
governmental bodies, they have begun to think more broadly
about limiting political authority to allow human persons and
54
55
56
57

See id. at 482–83.
See id.
Hittinger, supra note 50, at 488.
Id. at 487–88.
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social groups in society to flourish. Second, there is the theme of
constitutional government.
As the brutality of secular,
totalitarian governments became more intense, Christian
intellectuals have come to emphasize constitutionally-guaranteed
rights. The earlier expectation of a benevolent, divinely-ordained
ruler who promulgated moral laws has ceased to be a motivating
vision. Third, there is the theme of human rights. The leading
proponents of the movement to define universal human rights in
the post-war period were Christians steeped in the rich
intellectual tradition of the faith that recognized inherent limits
on governmental authority. Fourth, there is the theme of the
limits of legal moralism. The Thomistic notion of the moral
purposes of law has come under scrutiny, especially by
Protestant Christians, and a reconsideration in the context of
pluralism has begun. Fifth, there is the theme of pluralism. The
rise of a pluralistic, secular culture has made Christians think
more deliberately about the proper relationship between law and
culture, and the state’s role in that relationship. Finally, there is
the theme of justice for the poor. The Christian obligation to love
and care for the poor, the stranger, the widow, and the orphan
has placed modern Christians at the center of many
controversies over social and economic justice, which both limits
and makes demands on the instrumental state. These six
threads receive extensive treatment in CLT and can help create a
framework for piecing together an approach to Christian norms
of non-establishment.
A.

Subsidiarity

CLT provides excellent materials to describe the concept of
subsidiarity. Both Catholics and Protestants developed social
theories that limit government. Abraham Kuyper, a Calvinist
intellectual writing at the turn of the 20th century, developed a
theory of “sphere sovereignty.”58
Catholic social thought,
beginning at the end of the 19th century, developed a theory of
“subsidiarity.”59 Both theories protect the individual and those
groups that are not derived from the state: the family, church,
business, unions, the arts, science, professional and civic groups,
58
See generally Abraham Kuyper, Calvinism and Politics, in LECTURES ON
CALVANISM (1931), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 320–34.
59
MICHAEL GERSON, HEROIC CONSERVATISM (2008), as reprinted in CLT, supra
note 4, at 77, 78.
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charitable groups, and even the international community.60 The
overarching principle is that these groups are ordered toward the
common good.61 Higher authorities should not usurp the roles of
lower groups unless necessary to address deficiencies in carrying
out those roles; resources from higher authorities can be provided
to enable lower groups to do what they do best.62 Gerson’s piece
on subsidiarity is especially interesting, noting that the doctrine
is consistent with American philosophy: “The founders were well
aware of the central paradox of democracy: the strength of liberal
political institutions—institutions characterized by autonomy
and free choice—depend on the health of illiberal social
institutions—communities that teach moral rules and
obedience.”63 The instrumental state is limited in its ability to
control those social institutions.
B.

Constitutional Government

Christian thinkers like Maritain and Murray were convinced
that there needed to be constitutional guarantees in order to
protect individuals, churches, and other groups. Murray was the
primary drafter of Dignitatis Humanae, a document of the
Second Vatican Council, which grounded the right to religious
freedom in the dignity of the human person.64 The document was
a clear recognition of the need for constitutional guarantees of
the free exercise of religion by all persons and religious
institutions, without regard to the truth of the beliefs and
practices. The instrumental nature of the state leaves quite a bit
of room open for the leavening of moral and spiritual values.
Pope John Paul II, in Centesimus Annus, wrote that “[a]uthentic
democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the
basis of a correct conception of the human person.”65 Yet because
60
See HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT (1947), as
reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 479.
61
See Michael P. Moreland, The Pre-History of Subsidiarity in Leo XIII in this
volume, at 63. See also Elizabeth F. DeFeis, Religious Liberty and Protections in
Europe, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 73 (2006) (noting influence of Catholic
subsidiarity).
62
See PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUADRAGESIMO ANNO ¶ 80 (1931), as
reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 480.
63
GERSON, supra note 59, at 78.
64
See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY DIGNITATIS HUMANAE ¶ 2 (1965), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 475.
65
Russell Hittinger, Introduction to THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY
ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE (John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds.,
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there is no such consensus on a correct conception, Maritain and
Murray say this must be achieved “indirectly, through
evangelization and education of society itself [rather than
through exercises of jurisdiction, either direct or indirect, of an
established Church].”66
The recognition of a secular, instrumental state is part of the
teaching, despite the fact that some of the language in Dignitatis
Humanae signals a limited acceptance of legal and cultural
establishment.67 The issue of a “Catholic establishment” has to
be placed in the context of the larger debate within Catholicism
as to whether the modern documents, including those of the
Second Vatican Council, represent a rejection of prior teaching,
or whether they maintain continuity with prior teaching. Of
course, there is much continuity: Pope John XXIII in Pacem in
Terris makes clear that the purpose of political authority is to
attain the common good;68 government authority is a natural part
of the moral order and derives from God;69 and laws that
contravene the moral order are not binding.70 The debate
surrounding discontinuity and continuity is quite nuanced,71 but
it is significant because it gets to the core question of the extent
of religious freedom urged by Dignitatis Humanae. At the time
of the Council, it was certainly clear that the Church had rejected

2006), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 491 (quoting JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL
LETTER CENTESIMUS ANNUS (1991)).
66
Id. (alteration in original).
67
Dignitatis Humanae accepts establishments that exist under unique
historical circumstances. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, ¶ 6, supra note 64, as reprinted in
CLT, supra note 4, at 490. It further retains “freedom of the Church” language,
asserting the Church’s freedom “as a spiritual authority established by Christ the
Lord, upon which there rests, by divine mandate, the duty of going out into the
whole world and preaching the Gospel to every creature. The Church also claims
freedom for herself in her character as a society of men who have the right to live in
society in accordance with the precepts of the Christian faith.” Id. ¶ 13.
68
See JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER PACEM IN TERRIS ¶ 54 (1963), as
reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 80, 85.
69
See id. ¶ 46.
70
See id. ¶ 51. But the teaching saw a new emphasis on the people’s ability to
choose their rulers and type of government, as well as the emphasis on multi-branch
government. Id. ¶ 52.
71
See, e.g., Joseph A. Komonchak, Novelty in Continuity: Pope Benedict’s
AMERICA
(Feb.
2,
2009),
Interpretation
of
Vatican
II,
https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/684/article/novelty-continuity.
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its previous teaching that “error has no rights.” Yet CLT points
to the ambiguity regarding the acceptance and definition of
establishment.72
C.

Human Rights

The Catholic acknowledgement that rights must be
constitutionally guaranteed is not limited to religious exercise,
nor to the domestic realm. There is an entire body of civil,
political, social, and economic rights, and they are universal. The
Catholic intellectual contribution to the human rights discourse,
ultimately embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, was substantial.73 Jacques Maritain, a major contributor
to its drafting, noted its traditional roots: “How could we
understand human rights if we had not a sufficiently adequate
notion of natural law? The same natural law which lays down our
most fundamental duties . . . is the very law which assigns to us
our fundamental rights.”74 Despite criticism from Protestant
intellectuals like Reinhold Niebuhr, who thought the natural law
was a “dead end” without “the enlightenment, strength and
perfection of Divine Law,”75 the language of universal human
rights and the institutionalization of the commitment to human
rights (in governments and non-governmental organizations
worldwide) is undoubtedly a major contribution of Christian legal
thought.76
Human rights abuses that involve established
religions can help identify those limits to religious freedom that
thwart the common good.

72
CLT, supra note 4, at 490. For the view that Dignitatis Humanae did not
change the traditional teaching on church-state relations, see Patrick McKinley
Brennan, The Liberty of the Church: Source, Scope, and Scandal, 21 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 165, 170–74 (2013).
73
CLT, supra note 4, at 462–63.
74
JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE (1951), as reprinted in CLT, supra
note 4, at 457.
75
CLT, supra note 4, at 449 (quoting Brian McCall, Consulting the Architect
When Problems Arise—The Divine Law, 9 GEO. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 103, 117, 129 (2010).
76
See, e.g., C.M.A. McCauliff, Cognition and Consensus in the Natural Law
Tradition and Neuroscience: Jacques Maritain and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 54 VILL. L. REV. 435, 461–77 (2009); C.M.A. McCauliff, Union in
Europe: Constitutional Philosophy and the Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950, 18
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 441, 460–72 (2012).
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D. Limits to Legal Moralism
The Thomistic notion that law can make persons better,
more virtuous, has come under intense scrutiny from Protestant
Christians, and the debates are nicely presented in CLT.
Niebuhr spoke of the law of love, which would replace rigid moral
norms:
[T]he law, however conceived, accepts and regulates selfinterest and prohibits only the most excessive forms of it. It
does not command that we love the neighbor but only that we
not take his life or property. It does not command that we seek
our neighbor’s good but that we respect his rights. Broadly
speaking, the end of the law is justice. But we have already seen
that justice is related to love. . . . The law seeks for a tolerable
harmony of life with life, sin presupposed. It is, therefore, an
approximation of the law of love on the one hand and an
instrument of love on the other hand. . . . [D]istinction between
law and love is less absolute and more dialectical than
conceived in either Catholic or Reformation thought. . . . [Those
two] are too certain about the fixities of the norms of law. All
law . . . is more tentative and less independent of its authority
[than these suppose].77

Christian legal scholars David Skeel and the late Bill Stuntz
argue that since law cannot save souls, legal moralism is “nearly
always counterproductive” and “deeply wrong.”78 They point to
great social dangers of trying to equate the immoral with the
illegal as well as the dangers to faith communities.79 When faith
is made into a moral code, Christians focus on obeying rules and
not on moral discernment, and churches become pharisaical.80
Others challenge the Thomistic emphasis on the moral purposes
of law by noting that “[a]s a coercive force, law cannot effect
change from the inside. Standing alone, it cannot change the
internal dispositions and attitudes of the human person.”81
77
REINHOLD NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS (1953),
as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 444. Note also that Wolterstorff and Barth
would say that if the church understands its own nature, it would not say
government has the authority to do what Aquinas (and Calvin) say it should do.
CLT, supra note 4, at 486.
78
David Skeel & William Stuntz, Christianity and the Modest Rule of Law, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 838 (2006), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 433.
79
See id.
80
See id. at 432–33.
81
John M. Breen, John Paul II, The Structures of Sin and the Limits of Law, 52
ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 317 (2008), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 94.
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Gregory Kalscheur, S.J. argues that Catholic teaching itself—in
Dignitatis Humanae—“limits the moral aspirations of the law” in
connection with morals legislation.82 On the other hand, by
breaking out of the narrow focus on sexuality, which has
consumed so much Christian thinking on legal moralism, we
might be able to see that what we think of as rights-based law
can be reframed as an updated version of legal moralism. For
instance, laws governing how employers and employees treat one
another in terms of sexuality or race are usually cast as
prohibitions on discrimination. Yet many committed to a secular
state would agree that the law teaches people how to treat one
another with dignity and respect, which indeed seems designed
(if not in purpose, then in effect) to make people more virtuous.
E.

Pluralism

Christendom has ended.
But culture continues, and
obviously continues to be influenced by Christianity. Humans
are “world-makers” through their art, music, literature,
commerce, law, relationships, and sovereign and subsidiary
institutions,83 and culture is normative way of “being.”84 Culture
is “made manifest in speech, laws, and routine practices of some
self-monitoring and self-perpetuating group.”85 It has become
necessary to explore the link between culture and law, and CLT
notes a variety of Christian thought on the matter, with some
arguing that law leads persons “to the natural common good” and
others arguing that “[l]aws cannot generate values, or instill
values, or settle the conflict over values.”86 Obviously, culture
that is religiously pluralistic and secular poses a challenge for
Christians, potentially creating an emphasis on a church’s own
rights rather than on its contribution to culture. But the
materials in CLT invite consideration of what a pluralistic

82
CLT, supra note 4, at 445 (emphasis in original) (citing Gregory Kalscheur,
S.J., Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from
the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (2006)).
83
JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, TO CHANGE THE WORLD 3–4 (2010), as reprinted in
CLT, supra note 4, at 179.
84
JOHN PAUL II, ADDRESS TO UNESCO (June 2, 1980), as reprinted in CLT,
supra note 4, at 180–81.
85
RICHARD SHWEDER, WHY DO MEN BARBECUE? RECIPES FOR CULTURAL
PSYCHOLOGY 11 (2003), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 179.
86
CLT, supra note 4, at 182 (quoting Patrick McKinley Brennan and James
Davison Hunter, respectively).

MACRO_CARMELLA

56

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

8/14/2018 9:07 PM

[Vol. 56:39

culture means to a tradition that has known many ways of living
in culture: as a suffering minority group, as a free and selfgoverning group among multiple cultures, and as the group with
authority over all. The materials on the five main strands of
Christianity—Catholic, Lutheran, Anabaptist, Calvinist, and
Reformed—are particularly rich resources.
F.

Justice for the Poor

The final modern theme gleaned from CLT in an exploration
of non-establishment norms of a secular state is the commitment
to social and economic justice for the poor. Of course, this
commitment is not new, but its urgency has grown as suffering
has increased. The Gerson excerpts emphasize Catholic thinking
about solidarity with the vulnerable and oppressed,87 and Keller
writes of the radical nature of the concern for the poor as a
political concept in both Judaism and Christianity.88 The concern
is also connected deeply to the ancient commitment to the
common good. But the common good is a problematic concept for
the liberal state, since most governments rely on a utilitarianwelfare rationale like the public or national interest.89 Alasdair
MacIntyre also speaks of how impossible it is for governments to
conceptualize the common good when their distribution of goods
is based on power and wealth.90 Despite these discouragements,
Christians have continued to work tirelessly for the improvement
of the lives of others, and their constant service and advocacy is
perhaps the greatest Christian contribution to political thought.91
Even the work of political theorist John Rawls has been
influenced by the Christian outreach to the vulnerable: given the
unfair distribution of benefits and burdens, he built his theory of
justice on a conception that does not permit rulemaking from the
vantage point of privilege.92 The instrumental state simply
cannot be conceptualized without taking into account both the
economic successes and the economic inequities of its citizens.

87

See GERSON, supra note 59, at 79.
See TIMOTHY KELLER, GENEROUS JUSTICE: HOW GOD’S GRACE MAKES US
JUST (2010), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 364.
89
CLT, supra note 4, at 492.
90
See id. at 489.
91
See GERSON, supra note 59, at 79.
92
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4,
at 376.
88
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IV. A FRESH LOOK AT THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
I now return to the observations set out at the start of this
paper. Catholic and Evangelical Protestant institutions have
very little use for the Establishment Clause when it is not
playing a role that is redundant to the Free Exercise Clause. In
other words, these religious communities see little need for
setting “outer bounds” of religious freedom—at least not by way
of non-establishment norms. They accept in general the “public
order” limits to religious freedom, but the task of defining those
limits in particular circumstances is always a challenge. Indeed,
those public order limits may overlap with non-establishment
limits. My inquiry is this: whether Christian legal thought
compels, or at least supports, an interpretation of the
Establishment Clause marked by a lack of concern for nonestablishment norms that place boundaries on religious exercise.
In my reading of CLT, I have found ample material to enlighten
our understanding of Christian perspectives on notions of
“establishment” and to provide a six-point framework for further
exploration. Christian legal thought is not uniform; and given
the significant threads that critique and moderate Christian
claims to political and legal authority, Christians can claim no
single interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Yet there
remains a powerful strand of Christian thought that is
committed to the witness of the church alone, radically separate
from the state. Catholic institutions remain wedded to an
accommodationist approach to the clause because it is most
consistent with the harmonious vision of church-state
cooperation visible in its social teachings. But this harmonious
vision is an obstacle to thinking comprehensively about nonestablishment norms. The Establishment Clause is not premised
on harmony but on conflict. The worry is not only that the state
could manipulate and destroy the church, but that a church could
gain civil power over the state and its citizens.
Christian legal thought has a complicated relationship to the
secular, liberal state. Catholic teaching is that the state is
properly secular. Indeed, the current Catholic teaching is for the
constitutional guarantee of religious liberty,93 along with other
civil, political, social, and economic rights. Yet traditionalists
appear to voice great nostalgia for Christendom, when the
93

CLT, supra note 4, at 489–90.
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Kingship of Christ over all political authority was taught.
Indeed, Oliver O’Donovan points to the Religion Clauses as “the
symbolic end of Christendom,”94 and laments the fact that the
very notion of government and society being under Christ’s rule
is nearly impossible to conceive of once the liberal state and
religious pluralism are accepted.95 Christendom has ended: the
state does not have to obey Christ and cannot privilege and
financially support the Church’s mission; further, the Christian
definition of the “moral” good of the state and society no longer
governs, leading to what he calls a “demoralized conception of
society.”96
But the secular, liberal state is what we have, and it cannot
choose a religion for itself. This is the most basic of nonestablishment norms. In a pluralistic society marked by religious
equality and constitutionally guaranteed protections for religious
freedom, government protects the religious exercise of all. Under
these conditions, government has no capacity to give religious
preference.
Maritain believed that establishment violated
human equality.97
Indeed, the accommodationist narrative
offered by Catholics during the mid-20th century to justify aid to
parochial schools, described in Part I above, was grounded in the
concept of “non-preferentialism”—aid given to religious groups
evenhandedly. Churches in litigation argue for accommodation,
not for “denominational preference.” All have accepted the
notion of equal treatment.
CLT raises some very provocative questions that challenge
the liberalism of the state: What would it look like if the
magisterium returned to the 1925 Quas Primas and again called
for the Kingship of Christ for part of its social teaching, “to
regard their elected officials as viceregents of Christ the king?”98
Imagine the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops describing
Jesus as King over American society, with elected officials His
earthly agents. What kind of political discourse would result
from such a claim? Would it prompt government officials to
consider the common good beyond local or national self-interest?
How might this change our law-making? The Lemon test, though
94
95
96
97
98

O’DONOVAN, supra note 12, as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 471.
See id.
Id. at 472.
See CLT, supra note 4, at 490.
Id. at 485.
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much reviled, states a long-standing principle of political
liberalism: law must have a secular purpose. Would recognizing
the Kingship of Christ allow lawmakers to enact “Christian”
laws? What would they look like? Would they have secular
purposes? Would these laws be different from the Thomistic laws
with “moral” purposes? Presumably, laws with moral purposes
can be articulated in non-religious terms. But would the
Kingship of Christ prompt something different? Would it be
more like a situation in which legislators enacted sharia law? Or
is Christian lawmaking saved by the fact that law is not
“revealed” but comes from “nature and reason”?
In addition to elected officials, CLT also raises the possibility
of judges explicitly doing God’s will. CLT authors asked:
Does the historical shift away from a Christian worldview in
which divine law is always already present and widely
acknowledged, to a worldview in which what power there is
above human law is “from the people,” undermine Christian
(and other) arguments in favor of a judicial power to answer to
the divine law directly?”99

Using the example of a court that permits a suit for wrongful
death of a fetus when the state law did not provide for such a
cause of action, CLT asks whether courts can give legal, that is,
coercive effect “to obligations grounded in divine law, natural or
revealed.”100 Yet courts often find duties in equity that are not
based in text or precedent, but instead reason from analogy,
inference, and ethical principles of justice. Is it necessary for a
court to claim that it is doing God’s will? How can such a claim
be measured or tested?
I found these examples startling, because they ask us to
consider situations that step beyond those outer bounds to
religious freedom that I had supposed were set by the nonestablishment norms. Of course, any church can frame in its own
religious terms the way it thinks about elected officials and the
way judges ought to rule. But for the public actors themselves,
we typically think about shared rules of engagement and the
norms set for those groups: elected officials and judges owe duties
to the Constitution; the stability of law and political-legal
institutions is an important value among other values; judges are

99
100

Id. at 449.
Id. at 428 (emphasis in original).
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held to particular standards of impartiality. Moreover, and
perhaps most importantly, there is already tremendous latitude
in politics and law to “do” natural law because, as John Courtney
Murray noted, we all are natural lawyers.101 Must politicians
and judges make the claim that they are legislating and
adjudicating based on divine and natural law? How are such
claims possible in a religiously plural society with secular rules of
engagement?
CLT thus raises some central questions about the interplay
of Christian legal thought and the liberal state and highlights
concepts that both shape and detract from law in that politically
and religiously pluralistic context. In particular, CLT describes
the modern experience, noted above in Part III, which helps
mediate the theological concepts and commitments that can set
limits to (and define obligations of) the instrumental state:
subsidiarity, constitutional government, universal human rights,
limited legal moralism, pluralism, and justice for the poor. There
is a recognition that “creation, providence, the Fall, redemption,
the divine law, natural law and much more” are no longer part of
current jurisprudence, so that Christian legal thought influences
lawmaking in “subtle and unexpected ways.”102 I note, for
instance, that Kuyperian sphere sovereignty and Catholic social
thought on subsidiarity influenced the Bush administration
(2001–2009) in the design of its “faith-based initiatives” program
to fund religious social services at the local level.103 Christian
concepts like these, which provide a coherent moral vision and
make political sense in the instrumental state, can help not only
to conceptualize “the common good” but actually contribute to it
as well. This Christian influence by way of leavening the
political and legal culture may turn out to be a significant
contribution in the modern period.
In addition to the six themes I identified for exploring
Christian understandings of non-establishment norms, I would
add yet another category: the recognition of the dialogue between
notions of power and powerlessness, so central to Christian
theology and yet largely unexplored in Christian political and
legal thought.
In connection with interpretations of the
101

Murray, supra note 15, at 54.
CLT, supra note 4, at 426–27.
103
Lew Daly, European Dream: The Political Theology of George W. Bush’s
Faith-Based Initiative, 115 THEORIA: J. SOC. AND POL. THEORY 32, 33 (2008).
102
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Establishment Clause, I noted at the outset that the case law
tends to fall in the area of government messages and government
money.
The pietistic separationists, coming out of the
Anabaptist tradition (the soul-liberty Baptists of the founding
era), wanted nothing from government except freedom. But
Catholics and Evangelical Protestants are more likely to be
concerned that a heavy-handed Establishment Clause “weaken[s]
the Church’s place in society.”104 Perhaps it is because so much of
the Christian tradition is immersed in questions of political and
legal power and authority—as is thoroughly documented in
CLT—that Christians worry about their “place” in society if they
do not have political and legal affirmation.
But the
Establishment Clause disempowers in particular ways all
religious groups in connection with state political authority and
law-making authority.105 Christian notions of powerlessness can
be found in abundance in the Anabaptist tradition, but also
within the Catholic monastic and contemplative traditions.
Despite the wealth of contemplative thought and liturgical
practice that revolves around the notion of Jesus’ “power through
powerlessness,” there seems to be little, if any, attention paid to
its possible civic-political meaning. Perhaps a retrieval of these
sources on power and powerlessness and some reframing of the
questions will also assist with the exploration of what
Christianity has to say about non-establishment norms and, per
Niebuhr, the law of love.106
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CLT, supra note 4, at 490.
See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696
(1994); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1982).
106
See Niebuhr, supra note 77, at 444 and accompanying text. See also AGAPE,
JUSTICE, AND LAW: HOW MIGHT CHRISTIAN LOVE SHAPE LAW? (eds. Robert F.
Cochran, Jr., and Zachary Calo) (2017).
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